O diretor executivo da Fundação HACER, Eneas Biglione, escreveu um artigo criticando a utilização de biometria no registro eleitoral boliviano. Biglione resume no final o que está em jogo:
En Venezuela, el sistema biométrico ha venido jugando un rol fundamental para los fines totalitarios de su gobierno desde su instauración en el año 2004. En breve seremos testigos si el AS bajo la manga de la administración Morales consigue su único objetivo: eliminar definitivamente la transparencia de los comicios y lo poco que queda de democracia en el nombre de la modernización del padrón electoral.
O artigo também traz uma análise sobre o sistema venezuelano de votação eletrônica. E falando em biometria, o artigo traz um link para outro artigo sobre fraudes biométricas. Por sua vez, o artigo traz um link para o estudo "Impact of Artificial 'Gummy' Fingers on Fingerprint Systems" apresentado na Optical Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques IV e tem a seguinte conclusão:
In this paper, we illustrated a risk analysis for fingerprint systems. The risk analysis revealed that there are many attack ways to deceive the systems, even if their templates and communication are protected by a secure measure. Conventional arguments tend to focus on a question how to detect use of artificial fingers, which derive from live fingers of legitimate users. However, as we pointed out, there can be various dishonest acts using artificial fingers against the systems. We also pointed out that artificial fingers can be made not only of silicone but also of gelatin, and examined 11 types of fingerprint systems whether or not they accept the gummy fingers. Consequently, all of these systems accepted the gummy fingers all in their enrollment procedures and also with the rather higher probability in their verification procedures. The results are enough for us to see evidence that artificial fingers can be accepted by commercial fingerprint systems. The objection will no doubt be raised that it is very difficult to take an impression of the live finger from a legitimate user without the cooperation of her/him. Therefore, we demonstrated that the gummy fingers made from residual fingerprints can be accepted by all of the 11 systems. (grifos meus)
Um outro trabalho, "Biometrical Fingerprint Recognition Don't Get Your Fingers Burned", que foi citado no trabalho acima também tem uma conclusão muito interessante:
Manufacturers of fingerprint scanners currently cannot deliver convincing evidence that they can make a distinction between a real, living finger and a dummy created from silicone rubber or any other material. Therefore, our advice is not to use fingerprint verification with applications where the identification serves as proof of presence. Comparing all biometric verification possibilities, fingerprint scanners are (perhaps apart from keystroke dynamics) the least secure means of verification. It is the only system where the biometrical characteristic can be stolen without the owner noticing it or reasonably being able to [p]revent it.
Even in a case where confidential computer data are protected by means of fingerprint verification we advise use of this verification only in combination with a token, for example a smart card, on which the user's template is stored. This prevents unnoticed access by someone using a dummy when the template, with which the scanned finger is compared, is stored on the computer's hard disk. The security level of the combination of fingerprint verification and smart card should be compared to username/password security. Th[e] former can be considered more user-friendly.
With all applications that are considered to be protected by using biometric verification, techniques to compromise the system such as described in the appendices of this article should be very thoroughly examined. It should of course be taken into account that someone can break into a system if they put enough effort and resources into it (which is of course common with security issues). A problem with fingerprints is that neither the resources nor the skills to create a dummy are uncommon. Furthermore, the possibility of someone claiming to have been framed by someone else using methods that could not reasonably be prevented, must be eliminated. Otherwise the system is not suitable for the application. (grifos meus)
Enquanto isso, onde a inteligência não chega, o TSE está fazendo uma estimativa de preços para a implantação (sem nenhum suporte legal nem orçamentário) de identificação e autentificação de eleitores por biometria. O anexo de tal estimativa tem um dado interessante: ele diz que a estimativa de preços é para o recadastramento de, pelo menos, 3% do eleitorado brasileiro e pede o registro de preço para compra de 2.000 kits de coleta de impressões digitais (muito embora o anexo fala em 200 leitores de impressões digitais e câmeras). Fazendo a conta, então nós estaríamos falando de mais de 66 mil kits.
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